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Abstract: In 1985, Demsetz & Lehn argued both that the optimal corporate 
ownership structure was firm-specific, and that market competition would drive firms toward 
that optimum.  Because ownership was endogenous to expected performance, they cautioned, 
any regression of profitability on ownership patterns should yield insignificant results.   
To test the Demsetz-Lehn hypothesis, we use the zaibatsu dissolution program from 
late-1940s Japan as an exogenous shock to the pre-war ownership equilibrium.  Through that 
program, the U.S.-run occupation removed the more prominent shareholders from many of the 
most successful Japanese companies.  By focusing on the effect the program had on 
profitability and on the way firms responded to the program, we accomplish two goals:  (a) we 
avoid the endogeneity problem that has plagued much of the other research on the subject, and 
(b) we clarify the equilibrating dynamics by which competitive markets move firms toward 
their optimal ownership structure.   
With a sample of 637 Japanese firms for 1953 and 710 for 1958, we confirm the 
equilibrating mechanism behind Demsetz-Lehn:  between 1953 and 1958, the ex-zaibatsu 
firms did significantly reconcentrate their ownership structure.  As of 1953, the unlisted ex -
zaibatsu and new firms still had not yet been able to negotiate the transactions necessary to 
approach their optimum ownership structures, and even the listed firms had not fully undone 
the effect of the occupation-induced changes on managerial practices.  By 1958 they had, and 
the earlier correlation between profitability and ownership disappeared.  By then, firm 
profitability showed no correlation with ownership, whether under linear, quadratic, or 
piecewise specifications.  We further find no evidence that ex -zaibatsu firms sought to 
strengthen their ties to banks over 1953-58. 
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Does ownership matter?  For all the rhetorical references to Berle & Means’ 
1932 book, the debate largely entered the world of modern empirical research with 
Harold Demsetz and Kenneth Lehn in 1985.  Ownership matters, Demsetz & Lehn 
argued, but not in a way scholars would notice by regressing profitability on 
shareholding patterns.   
Instead, reasoned Demsetz & Lehn (and Demsetz, 1983), the optimal 
ownership structure will vary by firm, and market competition will drive each firm to 
choose its firm-specific optimum.  Because investors will then equalize at the margin, 
in equilibrium observed returns across firms will not vary systematically by the type 
of ownership structure in place.  True to the theory, when Demsetz & Lehn regressed 
profitability on ownership concentration, they found no relationship. 
Despite this logic, other scholars have not confirmed the empirics.  Instead, 
when they regress firm performance on ownership structure, they generally find some 
correlation.  Usually, the one they find is non-linear:  profitability rises at low levels 
of ownership concentration, then declines.   
Hence the debate:  On the one hand, by the very design of their models some 
scholars seem to suggest (however implicitly) (a) that the optimal ownership structure 
is in significant ways not firm -specific, and (b) that market competition need not drive 
firms to approach that optimum.  On the other, Demsetz  & Lehn argued in effect that 
many of these later regressions were fundamentally misspecified.  Because ownership 
was endogenous to expected performance, it seldom made sense to regress 
profitability on ownership.   
In significant part, the debate between D emsetz-Lehn and these writers is a 
debate over the effectiveness with which market competition drives firms toward their 
ownership optimum.  In the study that follows, we address that debate by using the 
Japanese zaibatsu-dissolution program as a natural e xperiment.  The American-
controlled occupation of Japan lasted from 1945-52.  During 1946-49, the government 
forcibly dissolved the pre-war zaibatsu shareholding networks.  It attacked the 
networks at a wide variety of firms, but the most prominent involved the Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda.  
By using this dissolution program as an exogenous shock to the pre-war 
ownership equilibrium, we avoid the obvious endogeneity program that plagues much 
of the research on ownership concentration.  Because the occupation did not stop 
firms from reconcentrating their ownership after 1949, however, we can also use the 
program to do more:  to focus on the empirically largely-ignored process by which 
firms approach their firm-specific ownership optimum.  Suppose market competition 
does drive firms toward their value-maximizing ownership structure (i.e., suppose 
Demsetz & Lehn are right).  If so, then the program must necessarily have caused the 
ex-zaibatsu firms subsequently either to reconcentrate their ownership, or to perform 
more poorly than before.  
Using a database of 637 large firms from 1953 and 710 from 1958, we 
confirm the essential Demsetz-Lehn logic.  We do not explain why writers after them 
have found the results that they did (though we note that many  do not advance a 
theory for their results either).  Instead, we show how ex-zaibatsu firms did 
restructure their ownership.  Many of the stock-exchange listed firms had already 
restructured their ownership before 1953.  Because the unlisted firms often needed to 
negotiate sales individually, they continued the reconcentration process after 1953, 
and regressions of 1953 profitability on ownership still show a significant 
relationship.  As unlisted firms negotiated better ownership structures, and as the 
listed ex-zaibatsu firms undid the managerial changes caused by the earlier Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 3 
occupation-imposed ownership structure, that effect disappeared.  By 1958, a 
regression of profitability on ownership structure yields the Demsetz-Lehn predicted 
equilibrium:  no relationship, linear or otherwise. 
We begin by reviewing the literature (Section I) and explaining the zaibatsu 
dissolution program, our data, and our variables (Section II).  We then turn to the way 
firms responded to the dissolution program by readjusting their ownership structure, 
and to the eventual effect that the process had on profitability (Section III.A.).  We 
ask whether the firms in our data base exhibit the patterns found by the other post-
Demsetz-Lehn studies (Section III.B.).  We conclude by exploring the implications 
our data pose for understanding the development of bank-firm relations in modern 
Japan (Section III.C.). 
 
I.  The Debate 
At least hypothetically, the relationship between ownership structure and 
profitability could take one of several forms (see generally Shleifer & Vishny, 1997: 
753-61).  In some firms, dispersed shareholdings might increase the odds that 
managers pursue non-value-maximizing strategies.  After all, dispersed shareholdings 
raise the coordination costs investors incur in monitoring the firm’s managers.  They 
also increase the divergence between the interests of the firm's managers and those of 
its investors.  
Alternatively, dispersed shareholdings might sometimes increase firm value.  
With a larger fraction of shares in play, a firm with dispersed ownership may be more 
strongly subject to the discipline of the corporate control market.  With a more liquid 
market for its stock, it may have a capital market advantage among investors wanting 
to diversify.   
Yet again, in countries like the U.S. and Japan with well-developed legal 
systems, none of this may matter very much.  Dispersed or no, access to courts may 
stop most managers from diverting substantial corporate assets.  Even if some residual 
agency slack might otherwise remain, the combined constraints of product, service, 
and labor market competition may induce firms to maximize profits, dispersed 
shareholdings or no. 
Demsetz & Lehn (1985) took a fundamentally different tack.  As they saw it, 
firms often did have an optimal ownership structure, but one that varied from firm to 
firm and one toward which market competition necessarily drove them.  Because 
investors would equalize on the margin, in equilibrium firms would exhibit the same 
observed profitability whatever their ownership structure.  When they then regressed 
firm profitability on ownership concentration (511 U.S. firms, 1976-80 data), they 
found exactly what they predicted:  no evidence that ownership patterns affected 
profitability.   
Despite this logic, others have persistently disputed the empirics.  Early on, 
Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1988) argued that ownership 
did exhibit an observable correlation with profitability -- just not a linear one.  To test 
the point, they regressed Tobin’s Q on piecewise dummies for board shareholdings 
(0-5, 5 -25, and over 25 percent).  Using a sample of 371 large U.S. firms (1980 data), 
they found that Q rose steeply with board ownership of under five percent.  Over the 
5-25 percent range it declined, and beyond 25 percent it then rose again (though not 
significantly).  For ownership by officers and outside-directors, they found much the 
same effect. 
John J. McConnell and Henri Servaes (1990) similarly argued that low levels 
of ownership concentration raised observable profitability while high levels did not.  Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 4 
With a data base of 1,000-1,200 listed U.S. firms from 1976 and 1986, they regressed 
Tobin’s Q on both the percentage of shares held by corporate insiders ( i.e., officers 
and directors) and that shareholding percentage squared.  Consistent with Morck-
Shleifer-Vishny, they found that as shareholding concentration rose, firm profitability 
initially increased but then fell.  Where Morck-Shleifer-Vishny found that Q peaked 
at board ownership levels of about 5 percent, McConnel -Servaes located the peak at 
40-50 percent.   
Empirical work since has not resolved the debate. On the one hand, 
Holderness, Kroszner & Sheehan (1999: 459) recently obtained results that "in terms 
of both signs and magnitudes, are strikingly similar to those found in Morck et al. ...."   
They too used a piecewise linear specification, but on a massive data base of 1,236 
U.S. firms from 1935 and 3,759 from 1995.  For both 1935 and 1995, they found that 
Q rises with officer and director ownership in the 0 to 5 percent range.  From 5 to 25 
percent, it falls for 1935 but is insignificant for 1995.  Beyond 25 percent, the 
coefficients are insignificant for both years.  Based on the stock-price effects of 
private equity sales, Wruck (1989) similarly finds that stock price  rises with 
ownership concentration in the 0 -5 percent range, falls over 5 -25 percent, and rises 
after 25 percent.  
On the other, Hermalin & Weisbach (1991) used an instrumental-variables 
approach on panel data (142 NYSE firms, 1971-83) to address the endogeneity issue.  
Regressing Q on piecewise variables, they reached results very nearly opposite those 
of Morck-Shleifer-Vishny, Holderness-Kroszner-Sheehan, and Wruck:  positive 
coefficients at management ownership levels of 0 -1 percent, but negative at 1 -5 
percent, positive at 5-20 percent, and negative beyond 20 percent.   
On Japanese data, the results have been just as inconclusive.  Using a linear 
model with 143 firms (1979-84 data), Prowse (1992) found no relationship between 
profits/equity and ownership concentration.  Weinstein & Yafeh (1998) similarly 
discovered no relation between profits/sales and ownership by the top 10 shareholders 
(686 firms, 1977-86; linear model).  They did, however, locate a significantly 
negative relationship between profits/sales and both ownership by financial 
institutions and ownership by non-financial firms.  In contrast, on his sample of 90 
Japanese firms from 1960, Yafeh (1995: 165; 90 firms) found that profits/sales 
increased with “main ba nk” shareholdings.  More recently, Morck, Nakamura & 
Shivdasani (2000; 1986 data for 373 firms) concluded that Q fell as “main bank” 
ownership rose from 0 to 5 percent, but increased thereafter; that it increased 
monotonically with managerial ownership; and that it increased monotonically with 
non-financial corporate ownership as well.  
Readers would do well not to confuse this debate with the discussion over the 
impact of corporate law on ownership patterns.  In a recent series of articles, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny ( e.g., 1998) show that ownership patterns vary 
in predictable ways by the legal system in place.  The relative benefits of concentrated 
and dispersed ownership depend, they reason, on the access investors have to legal 
machinery.  In the article below, we do not ask whether legal access affects ownership 
structures.  As Shleifer & Vishny (1997: 770) rightly explain, the United States and 
Japan both have "a legal system that protects investor rights."  Instead, we ask 
whether,  given a legal system that protects investors reasonably well, market 
competition drives firms to select a firm -specific optimum.  
 
II.  The Impact of Ownership on Profitability 
A.  Introduction: Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 5 
If, as Demsetz-Lehn argue, ownership is potentially endogenous to expected 
performance, then the straightforward way to explore the relation between the two is 
not to regress profitability on ownership.  It is to study the effect of an exogenous 
shock to ownership patterns.  The American-run zaibatsu-dissolution program offers 
precisely such a shock.  What is more, because the program did not require firms to 
maintain the new ownership structure, it offers a chance to examine what Demsetz-
Lehn hypothesized but which neither they nor subsequent scholars empirically 
explored:  the equilibrating mechanism by which firms move toward their ownership 
optimum. 
  Douglas MacArthur arrived to head the allied occupation (called the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers, or SCAP) in 1945.  Among the men on his staff, 
many believed that the pre-war zaibatsu had supported the war effort.  In truth, the 
zaibatsu had simply been successful industrialist families.  The most prominent had 
been the Mitsui, the Mitsubishi (the Iwasaki family), the Sumitomo, and the Yasuda.  
On average, they had invested in highly profitable firms (Miwa & Ramseyer, 2000b; 
Frankel, 2000).  Having amassed large amounts of wealth, they had then diversified 
by investing widely.  
In most cases, the zaibatsu firms owed this success neither to monopoly rents 
nor to armaments.
1  In most industries, they had neither had monopoly power nor 
been part of a successful price-fixing cartel.  When they invested in the war effort, 
they primarily had done so only under military pressure.   
To head its efforts at reconstructing the economy, SCAP appointed 
Northwestern economist Corwin Edwards.  In his own academic work, Edwards had 
taken a clear big-is-bad line, and he now imported that approach to his work at SCAP.  
The approach fit well with the anti-zaibatsu sentiment among MacArthur's staff, and 
under SCAP supervision in 1946 the Japanese government began the process of 
eliminating the zaibatsu.   
To dissolve the zaibatsu, the government effectively confiscated all shares 
held directly or indirectly by the most prominent z aibatsu families.  Nominally, it 
bought the shares.  Since it paid in non-negotiable 10-year government bonds and 
then promptly inflated the currency, however, the compensation came to very little.  It 
then resold the acquired stock.  It finished the process shortly after the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange reopened in 1949 (see generally Hadley, 1970: ch. 4).   
Before turning to the regressions themselves, note several things.  First, the 
mid-1950s were generally years with slower growth than either the first years o f the 
decade or the 1960s.  Despite lackluster performance during the earliest post-war 
years, the Japanese economy had taken a sharp turn for the better in 1950.  The 
Korean War had begun, and for the U.S. military Japan made a convenient operations 
base  and procurement source.  In constant prices, the Japanese economy grew 11 
percent in 1950, 13 percent in 1951, and 12 percent in 1952.  The boom ended the 
next year, though, and from 1953 to 1959 the growth rate hovered in the 5 to 9 
percent window.  It jumped to 13 percent in 1960, and stayed in the double-digit 
range for most of the 1960s (Nihon tokei, 1988: 409).   
Second, the debate over the post-war keiretsu is beyond the scope of this 
study.  Many observers argue that the pre-war zaibatsu continued in diminished form 
as the post-war keiretsu.  Although we argue elsewhere (Miwa & Ramseyer, 2000a) 
                        
1 This is not a point on which all observers would agree, but it also is not essential to this 
study. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 6 
that the keiretsu lack economic substance, we table the issue here.  Demsetz-Lehn 
argue that market competition will drive firms toward a firm-specific ownership 
concentration optimum.  The mix of owner-types may also  matter, but Demsetz-Lehn 
do not address the issue and we here follow their practice. 
Third, although during the 1950s Japanese law limited banks to no more than 
10 percent shareholding in any firm, banks seldom approached that legal maximum.  
Fourth, over the 1950s the fraction of outstanding shares individuals held fell at the 
same time that the total volume they owned rose.  In 1953 individuals held 56 percent 
of the 5.4 billion outstanding shares and financial institutions held 22 percent.  By 
1958, individuals held 50 percent of the 19 billion outstanding shares but financial 
institutions now held 26 percent (Tokyo shoken, 1981: 116-17).  
 
B.  Data: 
  For our tests, we assemble financial data on J apanese firms in most of the 
major manufacturing industries in 1953 and 1958.  Because the standard computer-
accessible sources (e.g., Nikkei NEEDS, Japan Development Bank) do not cover the 
1950s, we collect the data manually from the  Kaisha nenkan (Nihon  keizai).  The 
source lists what it considers all of the “major” Japanese firms.  This includes both 
most stock-exchange listed firms, and most large unlisted firms.   
  From the  Kaisha nenkan, we extract relevant financial data for all firms 
catalogued in t he following industries:  electrical equipment, instruments, 
automobiles, other machinery, shipbuilding, cotton spinning, weaving, other textiles, 
mining, coal, oil, steel, other metals, chemicals, paints, pharmaceuticals, food 
products, cement, and paper.  Through this process, we obtain a population of 645 
firms for the fiscal year ending in March 1953 and 721 for the fiscal year ending in 
March 1958.  We eliminate several firms either missing crucial financial data or 
yielding egregiously extreme values  (usually firms that undertook major capital 
restructuring in the middle of the accounting year).  Ultimately, we calculate 
profits/equity ratios for 637 firms in 1953 and 710 in 1958.  We include sample 
statistics in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
  Note a couple of preliminary comparisons to the Demsetz-Lehn sample.  First, 
Demsetz-Lehn's U.S. firms had modestly less concentrated ownership than our 
Japanese firms.  The top 5 shareholders in Demsetz-Lehn’s sample on average owned 
24.8 percent of the firm’s stock (1985: tab. 1).2  The top 5 shareholders in our sample 
owned 30.9 percent in 1953, and 34.8 percent in 1958 (Table 1).   
  Second, in both the U.S. and Japan the larger firms had more dispersed 
shareholding structures than the smaller.  To explore the determinants of ownership, 
Demsetz-Lehn regressed a logistic transformation of ownership concentration on, 
inter alia, industry dummies and firm equity.  The larger the equity, they find, the 
more dispersed the shareholding.  Regressing the same transformed variable on 
industry dummies and firm equity, we obtain the same result:  equity is strongly and 
negatively correlated with ownership concentration.  
  We collect data on the zaibatsu dissolution program from the records of the 
oversight committee:  Nihon zaibatsu to sono kaitai (see Mochikabu, 1950).  We use 
the data given in the zaibatsu shareholding table (it cover all shares held by the 
                        
2 The board of directors in the Morck-Shleifer-Vishny study (1988: 297) owned 10.6 percent.  
Insiders in McConnell-Servaes (1990) owned a mean 11-14 percent. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 7 
designated zaibatsu, their holding companies, and family members) found on pages 
140-91.  Of the firms in our  data base for 1953, 28 percent had some of their stock 
sold pursuant to the dissolution program.  At those firms subject to the program, the 
simple mean amount of stock sold was 31 percent.  Reflecting the diversified 
portfolios at the zaibatsu families, for most firms the fraction of shares subject to the 
program was modest:  80 to 100 percent -- 21 firms; 60 to 80 percent -- 11 firms, 40 
to 60 percent -- 36 firms, 20 to 40 percent -- 44 firms, and 20 percent or less -- 102 
firms. 
  To trace the firms in the 1950s to their immediate post-war antecedents, where 
necessary we use the Hompo shuyo kigyo keifuzu shu (see Ikujima, 1981).   
 
C.  Variables: 
  Using this data, we calculate the following variables: 
 
  1.  Dependent variables. 
  58-53 top 5 difference:  The fraction of stock held by the top 5 shareholders 
at a firm in 1958, less that fraction in 1953. 
  Profits/Equity:  Profits are after taxes and interest, in 1000 yen.  Equity is the 
sum of legal capital, all reserves, carryforwards, and current profits or losses, in 1000 
yen.  Obviously, the use of accounting profitability raises issues of reliability.  Note, 
however, three points.  First, in using profitability, we follow Demsetz & Lehn 
(1985). While we would have preferred to use Tobin’s Q as well, we lack the data to 
calculate it.  Second, Morck, Shleifer & Vishny (1988: 300; U.S. data), McConnell & 
Servaes (1990; U.S. data), and Morck, Nakamura and Shivdasani (2000: 552; 
Japanese data) all obtain similar results whether they use profitability or Q as their 
dependent variable.  Last, our basic point concerns the dynamics of the equilibrating 
process addressed in Table 2 -- for which profitability is simply not a central issue. 
  58-53 leverage difference:  Leverage (defined below) in 1958, less leverage 
in  1953. 
 
  2.  Independent variables. 
  Fraction of shares sold:  The fraction of a firm’s outstanding shares sold 
pursuant to the zaibatsu dissolution program.   
  Leverage:  1 less the ratio of equity to gross assets.  The maximum value of 
leverage exceeds 1 because of insolvent firms -- 3 in 1953, and 5 in 1958. 
  Gross assets:  Book value of a firm's gross assets, in 1000 yen.  We use this as 
a proxy for firm size.   
  Top 5 shareholdings:  The fraction of a firm’s shareholdings held by the five 
shareholders owning the most stock. 
  Top5-0to5, Top5-5to25, and Top5 -over25:  In order to compare our results to 
those in Morck, Shleifer & Vishny (1988: 298) and Holderness, Kroszner & Sheehan 
(1999), we calculate piecewise linear regressions using definitions comparable to 
theirs for the top five shareholders.   
  More specifically, Top5-0to5 is equal to the actual fraction owned by the top 
5 shareholders if that amount is less than 5 percent; it is .05 if the fraction exceeds 5 
percent.   
  Top5-5to25 is equal to 0 if the fraction owned by the top 5 shareholders is less 
than 5 percent; it equals the actual fraction owned less .05 if the fraction owned by the 
top 5 shareholders is more than 5 and less than 25 percent; it equals .2 if the top 5 
shareholders collectively hold more than 25 percent of the firm’s stock. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 8 
  Top5-over25 is equal to 0 if the fraction owned by the top 5 shareholders is 
less than 25 percent; it equals the actual fraction owned less .25 if that fraction 
exceeds 25 percent. 
  Exchange listed:  1 if public information on stock price is available; 0 
otherwise. 
  Industry dummies:  Dummies based on the industry categories used in 
Kabushiki nenkan. 
 
III.  Results 
A.  Reconcentration among Ex-Zaibatsu Firms: 
  Suppose market competition drove Japanese firms to s elect ownership 
structures close to their firm-specific optimum before the war.  All else equal, those 
same competitive forces should have driven the ex-zaibatsu firms to re-select a 
structure close to that optimum after the occupation-mandated sell-off.  Among the 
firms, moreover, market competition should have pushed the stock-exchange listed 
firms to restructure their ownership more quickly than the unlisted firms.  At the listed 
firms, investors could have assembled packages of shares whenever they located firms 
with low profitability caused by sub-optimal ownership structures.  At the unlisted 
firms, they would have needed individually to negotiate each transaction.  Even in the 
best of times, the process would have taken longer than among the listed firms.  For 
war-devastated Japan of the 1940s, they were anything but the best of times.   
In Table 2A, we regress the difference in top-5 shareholder ownership levels 
for 1958 and 1953 on,  inter alia, the fraction of a firm's shares sold under the 
occupation sell-off.
3  The coefficient is positive, significant, and robust to a variety of 
specifications:  ex-zaibatsu firms did reconcentrate their ownership during the period.   
In Table 2B, we divide the sample between listed and unlisted firms, and re-
run the principal regressions.  Again, the results confirm what theory predicts.  Given 
that the listed firms would already have been able to undo many of the occupation-
induced changes between 1949 and 1953, they changed their ownership structure little 
between 1953 and 1958.  Given that the unlisted firms would have needed more time, 
they continued the process after 1953.   
  In 1953, the population of ex -zaibatsu firms thus still included many unlisted 
firms trapped in a suboptimal ownership structure.  In addition, even the listed firms 
would not necessarily have had time to undo the managerial problems caused by the 
occupation-induced ownership shifts.  As a result, among the ex-zaibatsu firms share 
concentration could well have been correlated with profitability.  According to the 
first column of Table 3, it was.
4  As the unlisted firms negotiated better ownership 
structures, and as the ex-zaibatsu firms reimposed better managerial practices, that 
effect should have disappeared.  According to the second column of Table 3, it did.   
  [Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here.] 
 
B.  Equilibrium Ownership and Profitability: 
                        
3 We use profits/equity for 1958 as a measure of the potential gains to restructuring the firm's 
ownership. 
4 The point is consistent with Yafeh's (1995) conclusion -- based on a much smaller sample of 
111 companies -- that firms whose shares were sold off under the occupation were had lower 
profits/sales ratios in 1953. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 9 
  According to Demsetz-Lehn, a general regression of profitability on 
equilibrium ownership structures should yield no significant results.  At some firms 
ownership will not matter, and those for which it does will have selected their firm-
specifically optimal structure already.  According to our discussion above, by 1953 
many unlisted Japanese firms had not yet negotiated structures close to their optimum.  
By 1958, they would have had much more time to do so.  If Demsetz is right, then we 
may or may not see a significantly positive relation between profitability and 
ownership in our 1953 data.  In our 1958 data base, we should see none.   
We present our results for 1953 in Part A of Table 4, and for 1958 in Part B.  
To facilitate comparison with the principal extant studies, we report three regression 
models:  the simple linear model found in Demsetz & Lehn (1985), the quadratic 
model found in McConnell & Servaes (1990); and the piecewise model found in 
Morck, Shleifer & Vishney (1988) and Holderness, Kroszner & Sheehan (1999).   
[Insert Table 4 about here.] 
In our 1953 data, the coefficients on the ownership concentration variables are 
insignificant for the linear model, but significant in the quadratic model.  Although 
the coefficients are again insignificant in the piecewise model, the quadratic model 
suggests that firm value peaks at 47 percent.  If we replace the piecewise variables 
with one for concentration rates of under 50 percent and one for over 50 percent, the 
coefficients are again significant:  positive for the former, and negative for the latter.   
The correlation between profitability and ownership also shows the problems 
new unlisted firms h ad negotiating ownership structures during the chaotic post-war 
years.  Consider Table 5 -- where we divide the 1953 sample into four parts.  The 
regressions in Table 3 had showed the problems entrepreneurs at the unlisted ex-
zaibatsu firms had in negotiating the transactions necessary to re-select their 
ownership optimum.  The regressions in Table 5 indicate that the entrepreneurs 
behind the new unlisted firms had similar problems.  Like their peers at the ex-
zaibatsu unlisted firms, they too found it hard in those war-devastated years to 
negotiate their ownership optimum.   
[Insert Table 5 about here.] 
As the unlisted firms (both new and ex-zaibatsu) improved their ownership 
structures over the next five years and as all zaibatsu firms undid the managerial  
problems introduced by the occupation-induced ownership changes, the 1953 
correlation between profitability and ownership should have disappeared.  It did.  
Although the coefficient on  Top5-0to5 in the last column of Table 4.B. appears 
significantly negative, this cell includes only one firm.  Otherwise, the coefficients on 
the 1958 ownership variables are uniformly insignificant. 
 
C.  Implications for Bank-Firm Relations: 
  In his study of the zaibatsu dissolution program, Yishay Yafeh (1995: 166) 
attributes what he sees as the close bank-firm relations in post-war Japan to the 
lingering effects of zaibatsu dissolution.
5  Monitoring by a firm's "main bank" in 
Japan, he explains, emerged as a substitute for the earlier monitoring by zaibatsu 
shareholders.  More specifically, monitoring by a firm's main bank: 
can be interpreted as evidence that close monitoring of managers by financial 
institutions, who are involved in firm operations and hold equity stake in it, 
                        
5 Whether Japanese firms do have unusually close ties to a "main bank" is a subject beyond 
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"corrected" for insufficient postreform monitoring by shareholders and hence 
led to increased profitability.  ...  "Main Bank" monitoring [can thus] be 
interpreted as a capital market evolution in response to an exogenously 
imposed ownership structure. 
  If firms did adopt "main bank" ties to correct fo r the zaibatsu dissolution 
program, then those firms subject to the program should disproportionately have 
formed such ties.  In fact, according to our data the opposite occurred.  In Table 6, we 
regress the change in a firm's leverage during 1953-58 on,  inter alia, the fraction of 
the firm's shares sold under the program.  As the first column shows, the coefficient is 
significantly negative:  firms subject to the dissolution program  reduced their 
dependence on debt over the period.  Although the ex-zaibatsu firms did have 
disproportionately high leverage rates in 1953 (column 2), by 1958 that effect had 
disappeared (column 3). 
  [Insert Table 6 about here.] 
 
IV.  Conclusions 
  Under plausible conditions, concentrated shareholdings could either raise or 
lower a firm’s profitability.  If so, then the optimal ownership structure will vary from 
firm to firm.  Given competitive capital, product, and labor markets, the firms that 
survive will disproportionately be those that select ownership structures suited to 
them.  If investors equalize on the margin, regressions of profitability on equilibrium 
ownership concentration will then yield no significant results. 
  By using the zaibatsu dissolution program as an exogenous shock to the pre-
war ownership equilibrium, we test this logic.  Where most scholars have focused on 
the relation between ownership concentration and profitability in equilibrium, 
however, we examine the dynamics by which firms respond to such shocks.  More 
particularly, we examine the process by which firms undid the occupation-induced 
changes and chose ownership patterns closer to the pre-war equilibrium.   
Consistent with theory, we find that firms subject to the dissolution program 
did indeed restructure their shareholdings through the 1950s.  Where listed firms were 
apparently able to restructure their ownership quickly by 1953, the unlisted firms took 
more time.  As they did restructure their ownership, however, the earlier correlation 
between ownership concentration and profitability disappeared.  We do not know why 
so many scholars since Demsetz-Lehn have observed a correlation between 
profitability and ownership concentration under apparently equilibrium conditions.  
Suffice it to say that our results are consistent instead with Demsetz-Lehn's. 
Some observers have predicted that Japanese firms developed strong ties to 
banks in the 1950s to overcome the adverse effects of the zaibatsu dissolution 
program.  In fact, the opposite occurred.  Between 1953 and 1958, ex-zaibatsu firms 
reduced their debt.   They did not need a banking substitute for the earlier 
shareholdings for a simple reason:  they restructured their shareholdings themselves. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 11 




   n   mean   min.      max. 
A.  Ex-Zaibatsu Firms: 
1953 
   Profits/Equity  199    .103  -.730     .576 
   Top 5 shareholdings  202    .291   .012        1 
   Leverage  201    .660   .153    1.253 
   Gross assets (million yen) 201   6,112     33   97,100 
   Exchange listed  202    .861      0        1 
1958 
   Profits/Equity  206    .068  -.290     .346 
   Top 5 shareholdings  205    .332   .065        1 
   Leverage  206    .657   .108     .935 
   Gross assets (million yen) 206  13,900    225  152,000 
   Exchange listed  220    .773      0        1 
1958-1953 Differences   
   53-58 top 5 difference   188    .020  -.725     .693 
   58-53 leverage difference  187    .002  -.341     .304 
 
B.  All Other Firms: 
1953 
   Profits/Equity  438    .111  -.969     .622 
   Top 5 shareholdings  442     318   .019        1 
   Leverage  443    .643   .029    1.032 
   Gross assets (million yen) 443   2,190     32   35,100 
   Exchange listed  443    .707      0        1 
1958 
   Profits/Equity  504    .083  -.416     .467 
   Top 5 shareholdings  513    .368   .039        1 
   Leverage  515    .655   .000    1.228 
   Gross assets (million yen) 515   4,876    129    7,160 
   Exchange listed  565    .623      0        1 
1958-1953 Differences 
   53-58 top 5 difference   392    .023  -.543     .682 





  Sources:  Nihon keizai shimbun sha, ed., Kaisha 
nenkan [Corporations Annual] (Tokyo:  Nihon keizai 
shimbun sha, 1954, 1959). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 12 
 
Table 2: 
Change in Ownership Concentration, 1953-1958 
 
 
A.  All Firms        Dependent Variable:  58-53 Top 5 Difference 
 
Fraction of shares sold     .063     .060     .047     .049 
   (2.28)   (2.20)   (1.63)   (1.69) 
Top 5 shareholdings    -.494     -.486    -.513    -.507 
  (15.21)  (15.13)  (15.52)  (15.39) 
Leverage     .064      .074     .100     .104 
   (1.56)   (1.82)   (2.26)   (2.36) 
Gross assets (x1000 yen)    -3.42     -3.47    -4.07    -3.90 
   (4.28)   (4.39)   (4.82)   (4.65) 
Exchange listed    -.062    -.065    -.074    -.075 
   (3.92)   (4.18)   (4.57)   (4.65) 
Profits/Equity      -.187      -.104 
     (2.59)     (1.32) 
Industry dummies       no       no      yes      yes 
Constant      yes      yes      yes      yes 
 
Adj. R 2       .29      .30      .31      .31 
 
n     574      571      559      556 
 
 
B.  Listed and Unlisted Firms       Dependent Variable:  58-53 Top 5 Difference 
 
Fraction of shares sold    .218     .017    .177     .000 
  (2.85)   (0.62)  (2.24)   (0.00) 
Top 5 shareholdings   -.469    -.494   -.436    -.550 
  (7.30)  (12.95)  (6.47)  (13.79) 
Leverage   -.057     .129   -.038     .162 
  (0.58)   (2.97)  (0.34)   (3.48) 
Gross assets (x1000 yen)   -8.60    -3.29   -.157     3.86 
  (1.03)   (4.54)  (1.81)   (5.03) 
Profits/Equity   -.256    -.135   -.069    -.024 
  (1.78)   (1.59)  (0.42)   (0.26) 
Industry dummies      no       no     yes      yes 
Constant      yes      yes     yes      yes 
 
Adj. R 2      .34      .29     .36      .32 
 
n     126      445     123      433 
 
Firms involved:  Unlisted   Listed  Unlisted   Listed 
 
  Notes:  The table gives the coefficients, followed by the absolute 
value of the t-statistics in the line below.  Coefficient for gross 
assets is multiplied by 10 9. 
 
  Sources:  Nihon keizai shimbun sha, ed., Kaisha nenkan 




Profitability Among Ex-Zaibatsu Firms, 1953 and 1958 
 
 
           Dependent Variable:  Profits/Equity 
 
  1953  1958  . 
 
Top 5 shareholdings    .112    .032 
  (2.07)  (0.27) 
Leverage   -.236    .007 
  (3.20)  (0.20) 
Gross assets (x1000 yen)    .212    .311 
  (0.26)  (1.34) 
Exchange listed    .025    .015 
  (0.85)  (0.94) 
 
Industry dummies     Yes     Yes 
Constant     Yes     Yes 
 
Adj. R 2     .16     .18 
 




  Notes:  The table gives the coefficients, followed 
by the absolute value of the t-statistics in the line 
below.  Coefficients for gross assets are multiplied by 
109. 
 
  Sources:  Nihon keizai shimbun sha, ed., Kaisha 
nenkan [Corporations Annual] (Tokyo:  Nihon keizai 
shimbun sha, 1954, 1959). 
 Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 14 
Table 4: 
Ownership Concentration and Profitability, All Firms 
 
A.  1953 
     Dependent Variable:  Profits/Equity   . 
Top 5 shareholdings    .007    .206   
  (0.24)  (2.21)   
(Top 5 shareholdings)2     -.220   
    (2.45)   
Top5-0to5        .101 
      (0.05) 
Top5-5to25        .105 
      (0.92) 
Top5-over25       -.016 
      (0.42) 
Leverage   -.176   -.173   -.175 
  (4.52)  (4.47)  (4.50) 
Gross assets (x1000 yen)    .549    .834    .694 
  (0.70)  (1.06)  (0.87) 
Exchange listed   -.002   -.005   -.003 
  (0.14)  (0.33)  (0.24) 
Industry dummies     Yes     Yes     Yes 
Constant     Yes     Yes     Yes 
Adj. R 2     .10     .11     .10 
n     618     618     618 
 
B.  1958 
           Dependent Variable:  Profits/Equity. 
Top 5 shareholdings   -.005    .009   
  (0.30)  (0.14)   
(Top 5 shareholdings)2     -.015   
    (0.23)   
Top5-0to5      -13.477 
        (1.88) 
Top5-5to25          .056 
        (0.64) 
Top5-over25         -.012 
        (0.57) 
Leverage   -.034   -.033     -.031 
  (1.47)  (1.43)    (1.37) 
Gross assets (x1000 yen)    .234    .247      .283 
  (0.99)  (1.02)    (1.15) 
Exchange listed   -.013   -.013     -.012 
  (1.64)  (1.65)    (1.54) 
Industry dummies     Yes     Yes       Yes 
Constant     Yes     Yes       Yes 
Adj. R
2     .17     .17       .17 
n     689     689       689 
 
 
  Notes:  The table gives the coefficients, followed by the absolute value 
of the t-statistics in the line below.  Coefficients for gross assets are 
multiplied by 10 9. 
 
  Sources:  Nihon keizai shimbun sha, ed., Kaisha nenkan [Corporations 
Annual] (Tokyo:  Nihon keizai shimbun sha, 1954, 1959). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 15 
Table 5: 
 




A.  All Firms      Dependent Variable:  1953 Profits/Equity 
 
Top 5 shareholdings    .266    .044    .708   -.147 
  (0.66)  (0.34)  (1.80)  (0.48) 
(Top 5 shareholdings)2   -.089    .030   -.857    .173 
  (0.14)  (0.20)  (2.48)  (0.57) 
Leverage   -.104   -.252   -.001   -.114 
  (1.02)  (5.19)  (0.01)  (0.96) 
Gross assets (x1000 yen)    .082    2.85    84.1    .070 
  (0.11)  (2.12)  (2.09)  (0.01) 
Industry dummies     yes     yes     yes     yes 
Constant     yes     yes     yes     yes 
 
Adj. R
2      .23     .18     .18    -.14 
 
n      89     375      56      98 
 
Subsample:  Listed  Listed  Unlisted  Unlisted 
  Postwar  Prewar  Postwar  Prewar 
 
 
  Notes:  The table gives the coefficients, followed by the absolute value 
of the t-statistics in the line below.  Coefficients for gross assets are 
multiplied by 10 9. 
 
  Sources:  Nihon keizai shimbun sha, ed., Kaisha nenkan [Corporations 
Annual] (Tokyo:  Nihon keizai shimbun sha, 1954, 1959). 




Leverage and Ownership Concentration, 1953 and1958 
 
 
                   Dependent Variable 
 
  58-53 leverage  1953  1958 
  difference  Leverage  Leverage. 
 
Fraction of shares sold   -.046    .065    .000 
  (1.77)  (2.34)  (0.00) 
Top 5 shareholdings   -.047    .125    .124 
  (1.60)  (4.09)  (4.29) 
Gross assets (x1000 yen)    .071    .735    1.31 
  (0.09)  (0.87)  (3.20) 
Exchange listed    .003    .007   -.020 
  (0.18)  (0.45)  (1.43) 
 
Industry dummies     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Constant     Yes     Yes     Yes 
 
 
Adj. R 2     .03     .14     .07 
   




  Notes:  The table gives the coefficients, followed 
by the absolute value of the t-statistics in the line 




  Sources:  Nihon keizai shimbun sha, ed., Kaisha 
nenkan [Corporations Annual] (Tokyo:  Nihon keizai 
shimbun sha, 1954, 1959). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 17 
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